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/s/ Sara E. Kropf
Sara E. Kropf
Law Office of Sara Kropf PLLC
1001 G Street, NW, Suite 800
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 627-6900
sara@kropf-law.com

Attorney of Record for Amici Curiae
vi

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici Curiae are law professors who have long studied, taught, and written
about the Federal Rules of Evidence. Paul F. Rothstein is a professor at Georgetown
University Law Center; Jules Epstein is a professor at Temple Beasley School of
Law. Amici have a professional interest in the development and application of
evidence law. The panel here held that the government’s expert in a criminal trial
can present hearsay for its truth without satisfying the requirements of Rule 703 or
the prerequisites to admissibility under any hearsay exception. Amici believe that
misreads the Federal Rules of Evidence, undermines the general prohibition on
hearsay, and circumvents defendants’ cross-examination rights.
ISSUE FOR REVIEW
Whether the Federal Rules of Evidence permit the government’s expert, in a
criminal trial, to present an alleged co-conspirator’s hearsay confession of financial
misreporting to the jury for its truth without meeting the requirements for presenting
such hearsay under Rule 703 and without presenting any witness with personal
knowledge of—and who can be cross-examined about—the coercive circumstances
under which the statement was created, as required by Rule 803(6).

1

Pursuant to FRAP 29 and this Court’s Rule 35-9, counsel for amici curiae states
that no party or counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part or made a
monetary contribution to the preparation and submission of this brief. Pursuant to
this Court’s Rule 35-6, amici have filed a motion requesting leave of court to file
this amicus brief.
1

ARGUMENT2
I.

Rules 703 and 803(6) Are Designed to Preserve a Defendant’s CrossExamination Rights and Provide Critical Protections Against Hearsay
A.

The Hearsay Rules Protect Cross-Examination Rights

The Federal Rules of Evidence prohibit the introduction of hearsay—an outof-court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted—unless the statement
falls within certain well-defined exceptions. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c), 802. The “main
justification for the exclusion of hearsay” is the “lack of any opportunity for the
adversary to cross-examine the absent declarant whose out-of-court statement is
reported.” 2 Broun, McCormick on Evidence §245 (7th ed.). The “hearsay rules and
the Confrontation Clause” thus are “designed to protect similar values.” California
v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 154 (1970).
Cross-examination serves a crucial role—it is “the greatest legal engine ever
invented for the discovery of truth.” Id. at 158 (quoting 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence
§1367 (3d ed. 1940)). Among other things, cross-examination ensures “[t]he
defendant will have a chance to inquire into the circumstances under which [a
declarant’s] statements were made and the motives that might have led the declarant
to color their truth at the time.” United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 407 (1986).3

2

This brief does not contain as separate fact section as all relevant facts are
summarized in Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc on Behalf of
Defendant-Appellant Paul L. Behrens.
3
This brief cites several cases decided before Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
2

Thus, when hearsay is “introduced against a criminal defendant without the benefit
of cross-examination,” a trial’s truth-finding function is “uniquely threatened.” Lee
v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986).
There are, of course, exceptions to the hearsay prohibition. Those exceptions
may diverge in substantive requirements, but each reflects well-established principles that ensure the statement’s reliability. The panel’s decision here implicates two
Federal Rules of Evidence that allow for disclosure of hearsay to the jury where
certain safeguards of reliability are met: Rule 703, which governs an expert witness’s
disclosure of otherwise inadmissible evidence, and Rule 803(6), the “business
records” exception. The panel’s decision eradicated the safeguards in both rules,
denying Defendants the ability to “inquire into the circumstances under which” the
restatement was made and “the motives” WellCare had that may have “color[ed]”
its decisions and render the restatement unreliable. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 407.
B.

Rule 703 Allows an Expert To Disclose Hearsay Only Where
Specific Safeguards Are Met

Rule 703 allows an expert who has “base[d]” his opinion on facts or data that
“would otherwise be inadmissible” to “disclose them to the jury,” but only under
certain circumstances. First, the expert must have relied on the information in
forming his opinion; second, the evidence’s proponent must establish that its

(2004). Crawford did not overrule these cases as to the importance of cross
examination to determine a hearsay statement’s reliability.
3

“probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs its
prejudicial effect.” Fed. R. Evid. 703. Even if both requirements are met, the
statements are not admissible for their truth, but rather “only for the purpose of
assisting the jury in evaluating an expert’s opinion.” Fed. R. Evid. 703 advisory
committee note; see also 2 Broun, McCormick on Evidence §324.3 (7th ed.). Rule
703 is thus a limited exception. It retains “a presumption against disclosure to the
jury of information used as the basis of an expert’s opinion.” Fed. R. Evid. 703 advisory committee note. It does not permit “misuse” of experts to present otherwise
inadmissible evidence “for substantive purposes.” Id.
As academic treatises explain, Rule 703 does not permit an expert “to testify
that other experts have the same opinion as he does.” 6 Fishman et al., Jones on
Evidence §42:11 (7th ed. 2013). Such corroborative testimony would be “relevant
only as inadmissible hearsay to bolster the expert witness’s testimony.” Id.; see also
Rothstein et al., Evidence: Cases, Materials, and Problems 262 (4th ed.) (collecting
cases); Weissenberger, Federal Evidence §7.03(5) (2d ed.).
C.

Rule 703’s Limitations Are Critical Because Expert Witness Are
Particularly Problematic as Hearsay Conduits

Rule 703 “is not an open door to all inadmissible evidence disguised as expert
opinion.” United States v. Scrima, 819 F.2d 996, 1002 (11th Cir. 1987). The
safeguards it contains exist, among other reasons, to protect against “Rule 703 improperly becoming a ‘backdoor’ hearsay exception.” 2 McCormick On Evidence
4

§324.3 (Brown 6th ed. 2006). It is clear that parties may not “bring inadmissible
hearsay and documents before the jury in the guise of expert testimony to prove
subsidiary facts” in the case. Pelster v. Ray, 987 F.2d 514, 527 (8th Cir. 1993).
“When an expert witness relies on inadmissible facts and data in the formulation of an opinion, the ability of a criminal defendant to cross-examine the expert
witness effectively is crucial to the preservation of confrontation rights.” Weinstein
et al., Weinstein’s Evidence Manual §13.04[1] (7th ed. 2015). Where an expert
cannot testify to the circumstances of the hearsay statement, it creates “a screen
against cross-examination.” In re James Wilson Assocs., 965 F.2d 160, 173 (7th Cir.
1992). The defendant is effectively “subjected to the testimony of a witness whom
he may not cross-examine.” United States v. Tran Trong Cuong, 18 F.3d 1132, 1143
(4th Cir. 1994). Rule 703 does not “permit an expert witness to circumvent the rules
of hearsay by testifying that other experts, not present in the courtroom, corroborate
his views.” United States v. Grey Bear, 883 F.2d 1382, 1392-93 (8th Cir. 1989).
As discussed below, the panel’s ruling contradicts these settled principles. It
instead allows courts to dispense with Rule 703’s requirements and permits an expert
to disclose uncross-examinable hearsay to the jury, all while allowing the government to use those statements as substantive evidence of the defendant’s guilt.
D.

The Business Records Exception to the Hearsay Prohibition in Rule
803(6) Likewise Includes Careful Restrictions

Rule 803(6) is the “business records” exception to the hearsay prohibition. For
5

the record to be admissible, it must have been created “at or near the time” of the
event, kept in the course of a “regularly conducted” business activity and that making
the record was a “regular practice” for that activity. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). But “even
a record that satisfies the basic requirements is excludable if it is untrustworthy”—
for example, if it “was prepared with an eye toward litigation.” 4 Mueller et al.,
Federal Evidence §8:78 (4th ed.).
The Rule, moreover, is “unusual in expressly including” a requirement for
“foundation testimony.” 4 Mueller, supra, §8:78. It “requires the testimony of a custodian or other qualified witness who can explain the record-keeping procedure
utilized” and show that the requirements of the business record exception are met.
United States v. Garnett, 122 F.3d 1016, 1018-19 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam)
(emphasis added). “The reason for doing so is that the elements of the exception are
elaborate and require what amounts to an ‘insider’ to describe the record-making
process” and verify that the conditions that would render the record reliable are in
fact satisfied. 4 Mueller, supra, § 8:78; see also 30C Graham et al., Federal Practice
& Procedure, Evidence §7047 (2014 ed.).
As discussed below, the panel dispensed with the business records foundation
requirement altogether. It ruled that an expert witness could disclose hearsay
statements in purported business records where the expert himself has no personal
knowledge of the document’s preparation, and no other witness with knowledge has
6

laid the foundation required by the Rule.
II.

The Panel’s Misapplication of the Rules of Evidence Sets a Dangerous
Precedent for Other Criminal Cases
A.

The Panel Disregarded the Rules’ Plain Requirements

The government expert’s presentation of the contents of WellCare’s restatement to the jury cannot be upheld under Rule 703. The district court never found
that the restatement’s probative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.
See Behrens Br. 93-95; Behrens Reply 33-37. Nor did the government and its expert
present the restatement for the purpose Rule 703 allows—informing the jury of the
basis of the expert’s opinion. Instead, they used it for the truth of its contents—as
evidence WellCare agreed its prior numbers were false. The panel admitted that the
expert used it “primarily [to] corroborate[] his own . . . analyses,” Op. 118 (emphasis
added), and not simply to explain the basis of his opinion.
The panel held that Rule 703’s limits did not apply “because the financial
restatement was admissible as a business record under Rule 803(6).” Op. 118. But
the government did not offer the testimony necessary to lay the foundation for the
business records exception, either. Behrens Pet. 11. No insider testified that the
restatement was made at the time by someone with knowledge, that it was kept in
the course of “regularly conducted activity,” or that making the record was a “regular
practice of that activity.” Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). The trial record is silent as to the
elements of Rule 803(6); the panel cannot manufacture them out of thin air to
7

absolve the government’s misuse of the expert’s testimony.
The panel’s circular reasoning does not comply with the Rules. It held that the
government need not comply with Rule 703’s requirements for expert testimony
because the restatement is admissible as a business record; but the government need
not prove the restatement admissible as a business record under Rule 803(6) because
its contents were presented by an expert. Behrens Pet. 12. The panel thus allowed
testimony on the restatement’s contents under the auspices of both Rules, without
requiring any of the indicia of reliability under either one.
B.

The Panel’s Holding Allowing Experts To End-Run Around The
Rules’ Requirements Undermines the Default Prohibition Against
Hearsay and Criminal Defendants’ Cross-Examination Rights

The panel’s holding has far-reaching—and extremely harmful—implications
for criminal defendants in future cases. It allows the government, through use of
expert witnesses, to fatally undermine the hearsay rules and circumvent defendants’
cross-examination rights.
1.

It is critical to note that the panel’s reasoning in allowing an expert to

present otherwise-inadmissible hearsay evidence to the jury extends beyond purported business records. It would permit a government expert to present all types of
hearsay evidence against a criminal defendant without providing the foundation that
the Rules require to ensure the reliability of that evidence. For example, suppose a
government expert on organized crime in a RICO case is to testify about how to
8

interpret a handwritten note written by a co-conspirator appearing to summarize the
structure of a street gang. Under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), that statement would not come
into evidence without a showing that there was a conspiracy, that the person who
wrote the note was a co-conspirator and so forth. The panel’s decision would allow
the expert to present the note’s contents to the jury without establishing the
foundational requirements of the co-conspirator exception. A government expert
could likewise testify about street lingo in a wiretap recording without having to
testify under Rule 901(b)(9) about how the recording was made or identify the
speaker under Rule 901(b)(5).
As those examples show, cross-examination is critical on foundational issues
to ensure that evidence presented to a jury is sufficiently reliable. Inadi, 475 U.S. at
407. The panel’s decision eviscerates a defendant’s ability to use cross-examination
to challenge the reliability of the government’s evidence, simply because it is
presented through an expert witness. Nowhere do the Rules—or precedent of this
Court—contemplate such an outcome.
2.

In People v. Sanchez, 374 P.3d 320 (Cal. 2016), the California Supreme

Court cogently addressed the problems raised when the government uses an expert
to circumvent hearsay rules and defendants’ cross-examination rights. In Sanchez,
the government offered an expert who testified about gangs, including gang culture
and the gang of which the defendant was allegedly a member. But the government
9

then elicited testimony from the expert about the defendant’s prior contacts with
police, including statements by the defendant to the police, even though the expert
had not been present when those statements were made.
The court explained the problems with allowing experts to testify to hearsay,
and particularly where it concerns facts the government has the burden of proving:
Generally, parties try to establish the facts on which their theory of the case
depends by calling witnesses with personal knowledge of those case-specific
facts. An expert may then testify about more generalized information to help
jurors understand the significance of those case-specific facts. An expert is
also allowed to give an opinion about what those facts may mean. The expert
is generally not permitted, however, to supply case-specific facts about which
he has no personal knowledge.
Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 327-28 (emphasis added). When an expert is testifying about
case-specific facts and “no other evidence” of those facts has been admitted, then
“there is no denying that such facts are being considered by the expert, and offered
to the jury, as true.” Id. at 333. “[A]n expert cannot . . . relate as true case-specific
facts asserted in hearsay statements, unless they . . . are covered by a hearsay
exception.” Id. at 334.
3.

The same conclusion is required here. As an initial matter, the re-

statement was unquestionably “case-specific,” as it related to the correctness of the
very WellCare expenditure reports at issue in the criminal trial. The expert used the
restatement to buttress his expert opinion that WellCare’s initial accounting for the
80/20 payments was false, opening the door for the government to argue in closing
10

that the company’s well-regarded auditor (Deloitte) had given the restatement its
stamp of approval as well as to demonstrate its supposed trustworthiness. No other
witness had testified to the contents or reliability of the restatement. As a result,
under Sanchez’s reasoning and the plain language of the Rules, these statements had
to be “covered by a hearsay exception.” 374 P.3d at 334. Yet the panel did not require
that the government lay the foundation necessary to do so.
C.

The Panel’s Decision Sets a Dangerous Precedent Given the Reality
of White-Collar Criminal Prosecution and the Use of Restatements
in Those Prosecutions

The panel’s decision not only eviscerates a defendant’s ability to challenge
the reliability of hearsay statements, but also sets a dangerous precedent given how
white-collar criminal investigations are handled in today’s climate.
In recent years, the Department of Justice has simultaneously encouraged cooperation by corporations under investigation and prosecuted more of those corporations’ executives. The DOJ insists on full corporate cooperation in criminal
investigations to earn cooperation credit. See U.S. Attorney’s Manual §§928.300(A)(4), 9-28.700, 9-28.720. Just this April, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
unit of DOJ’s Fraud Section promulgated a pilot program that “is designed to
motivate companies to voluntarily self-disclose FCPA-related misconduct [and] fully cooperate with the Fraud Section.” Available at https://www. justice.gov/opa
/blog/criminal-division-launches-new-fcpa-pilot-program. The program authorizes
11

DOJ to offer a company up to a 50% reduction in recommended sentence if it
cooperates fully with the Department’s demands.
In September 2015, DOJ promulgated guidance on Individual Accountability
for

Corporate

Wrongdoing.

Available

at

https://www.justice.gov/dag/file

/769036/download. Known colloquially as the “Yates Memo,” it makes clear that
DOJ seeks to prosecute more corporate executives, reasoning that “[o]ne of the most
effective ways to combat corporate misconduct is by seeking accountability from
the individuals who perpetrated the wrongdoing.” Id. at 1.
When the government threatens criminal action, the pressure to succumb and
admit fault is extreme. “Faced with threatened criminal charges, most companies
agree to settle because the collateral consequences of a conviction . . . are so harsh—
in many cases, they amount to a corporate death sentence.” Copland & Mangual,
Justice Out of the Shadows: Federal Deferred Prosecution Agreements and the
Political Order, at 4 (June 2016). Health care providers “are particularly susceptible
to collateral consequences that can destroy the company if convicted of a crime.”
Podgor, White Collar Innocence: Irrelevant in the High Stakes Risk Game, 85 Chi.Kent L. Rev. 77, 88 n. 4 (2010). WellCare, for example, faced possible exclusion
from the Medicare system in Florida—a consequence that would have threatened its
very existence.
The government often extracts a restatement of a company’s earnings as part
12

of its cooperation efforts—a fact often noted in deferred prosecution agreements.
See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement ¶4, in United States v. Arthrocare Corp.
(W.D. Tex. Dec. 30, 2013) (company “engaged in extensive remediation, including
restating its financial statements”), available at http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/
prosecution_agreements/sites/default/files/pdf/Arthrocare.pdf. Likewise, the SEC
considers a company’s willingness to restate financials in deciding whether to
initiate an enforcement action. See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 44969, 76 SEC
Docket 220 (Oct. 23, 2001). And a prompt restatement can dramatically affect the
penalties levied. One study found that, “for each week earlier that a restatement is
announced to the public,” the SEC’s corporate penalties “are reduced by $434,000.”
Files, SEC Enforcement: Does Forthright Disclosure and Cooperation Really
Matter?, 53 J. Accounting & Econ. 353, 355 (2012).
As companies restate to show their cooperation, their executives often pay the
price for what is said in those restatements. Those executives—like Defendants
here—do not have a hand in drafting the restatement. The company’s strategy is not
to craft a restatement so as to mitigate its executives’ criminal liability down the
road. It is to capitulate so as to avoid punishment altogether.

13

D.

This Case Demonstrates the Danger of Allowing Financial
Restatements to be Used Against Defendants Where the Rules’
Limited Exceptions to Use of Hearsay Are Not Satisfied

This case illustrates the dangers of allowing uncross-examinable hearsay to
be put before the jury. WellCare’s financial restatement was hearsay. Yet the government presented WellCare’s restatement to the jury, through the government’s
expert, as an admission by the company and its auditors that its prior reporting was
wrong. As Judge Hull commented during oral argument, that use of the restatement
was “big time prejudicial.” Oral Argument at 1:26:26, United States v. Clay et al.,
No. 14-12373 (11th Cir. held Oct. 2, 2015).
WellCare restated its financials only under extreme pressure from the government. Because none of the Rules’ safeguards for presenting hearsay were satisfied,
however, Defendants had no opportunity to examine any government witness about
the circumstances of the restatement’s creation or to test its reliability. The panel
ignored the purpose of the Rules to prevent precisely this circumstance—the
admission of unreliable and uncross-examined hearsay.
Specifically, Defendants could elicit no testimony from the government’s
expert regarding the circumstances of the restatement’s creation, including that it
followed a 200-agent raid of WellCare’s headquarters. The raid prompted WellCare
to announce “extensive” cooperation with the government in an effort to avoid
prosecution. See Behrens Pet. 6-7. WellCare faced pressure from the Florida agency
14

that oversees the Medicaid program, AHCA, which threatened to stop allowing
WellCare do business in Florida. Id. And there was evidence that AHCA and
prosecutors chose the methodology WellCare and its auditors used in the restatement. Id. But the government’s expert had no personal knowledge of the restatement’s preparation, and so could not be cross-examined about any of that. Id.
Despite the expert’s lack of personal knowledge, the trial judge permitted the
government to elicit hearsay statements from him and to argue during closing that
these hearsay statements were substantive evidence that WellCare’s initial accounting was false—an element of the charges against Defendants. The circumstances
surrounding the drafting of WellCare’s restatement demonstrate its inherent
unreliability. Although it may not be a coerced confession in a literal sense, it was
far from a freely-made admission. It was extracted from a company facing its
possible demise if it did not cooperate with the government’s demands. The panel’s
decision nowhere takes into account how the restatement came to pass or its inherent
unreliability under those circumstances. Worse yet, it eliminated the very safeguards
imposed by the Rules of Evidence to protect Defendants from the dangers of
conviction based on unreliable hearsay evidence.
CONCLUSION
The Court should grant en banc review in this case.

15
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